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The ‘Arab Spring’: implications for US–Israeli relations
Banu Eligu¨r*
Political Science and International Relations Department, Bas¸kent University, Ankara,
Turkey
This article argues that the ‘Arab Spring’ has ended the long-standing US–
Israeli common strategy of supporting pro-Western and semi-secular
autocracies in the Arab world. During these tumultuous events Washington
chose to support the rebellions to varying degrees, thus exacerbating Israel’s
concerns regarding the adverse regional implications attending this shift
(notably the ascendance of Islamist regimes and the diversion of world
attention from Iran’s nuclear quest). By way of ameliorating such threats, the
US needs to pursue a policy of supporting pro-democracy groups in the
region while formulating a clear policy to deal with the threats from Iran and
radical Islamist groups. All in all, the ‘Arab Spring’ has created a highly
volatile strategic environment thus making Israel an even more valuable
strategic ally for the US
Keywords: ‘Arab Spring’; US–Israeli relations; Islamism; Egypt; Iran;
al-Qaeda
Since its foundation Israel has had a special relationship with the US. Bilateral
relations were deepened particularly since 1967 and continued in the post-Cold
War period. The 9/11 terrorist attacks added a new strategic paradigm to the
bilateral relationship: the war on Islamist terrorism. The special relationship
between the US and Israel can be characterized by three factors: shared common
strategic interests, shared values (i.e. commitment to Western-style democracy),
and political influence of US Jewry.1 Israel relies on the US for arms supplies and
enjoys approximately $3 billion annual military and economic assistance as well
as political support. For the US, Israel is a strong and reliable ally in a
strategically important, yet highly unstable region.2 Despite differences of
opinion regarding the Israeli–Palestinian peace talks and the means for dealing
with Iran’s nuclear programme, US–Israeli defence ties have increased during
the Obama administration3 and both allies continue to share common strategic
interests in the Middle East such as containing Tehran’s regional influence and
opposing its nuclear programme, supporting pro-Western regimes like Jordan,
and countering the threat of Islamist terrorism.4 There is considerable US public
support for Israel. A February 2013 Gallup poll, for example, indicated that 64%
of Americans expressed sympathy with Israel – the highest figure that the Gallup
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recorded in 25 years.5 Yet the American response to the ‘Arab Spring’ revealed
increasingly divergent strategic interests between the two allies.
Following the recent Arab upheavals the longstanding US and Israeli
common strategy of supporting pro-Western and semi-secular autocracies in the
Arab world has come to an end as Washington supported the rebellions to varying
degrees. The deep economic crisis since 2008 and America’s costly experiences
in Iraq and Afghanistan led it to adopt a new strategy of ‘multilateral
retrenchment’.6 By pursuing this strategy, Washington aims at reducing the scope
of its overseas commitments and shifting burdens onto global partners.7 The
Obama administration, contrary to its predecessor, wanted to focus primarily on
Chinese and Pacific Rim issues instead of the Middle East.8 The new US strategy,
which required a less activist foreign policy, and the Obama administration’s
benign stance towards the rising Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in Egypt raised
Israel’s concerns.
It should be noted that the change in the traditional US foreign policy towards
the region’s semi-secular autocracies and secular orders started during the Bush
administration. In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the Bush administration, in
order to counter the threat of Islamist terrorism, pursued a policy known as the
‘Freedom Agenda’ or the ‘Greater Middle East Initiative’. The policy consisted
of exporting democracy and open market economics to the Muslim Middle East
either by applying the US military force as in the case of Iraq9 or by advocating
‘moderate Islam’ as a state model, the latter which ranged from the US training
and supporting liberal activists to promote democracy in Egypt against Hosni
Mubarak’s authoritarian rule10 to embracing Turkey’s Islamist Justice and
Development Party.11
Yet the US policy resulted in unintentional consequences for Israeli national
security. For example, Hamas won the 2006 Palestinian elections and violently
seized control of Gaza the following year. Likewise, after the 2003 Iraqi war the
regional balance of power shifted in favour of the Shiite axis led by Iran. In Iraq a
democratically elected Shiite-led government was formed, enabling Tehran to
extend its sphere of influence over the country. A strong Shiite axis emerged in
the region comprising Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, and Iraq.12
By the end of the Bush administration, relations between the US and the
Muslim world reached their lowest point in 60 years. A 2007 poll conducted by
World Public Opinion Organization revealed that an average of 79% of
respondents in Egypt, Morocco, Pakistan, and Indonesia argued that the US
sought to ‘weaken and divide the Islamic world’, while a similar percentage
maintained that the US wanted ‘control over the oil resources of the Middle
East’.13 The Obama administration emphasized re-establishing trust with the
Muslim world, which it viewed as a strategic asset in the ‘war on terror’.14 The
new president addressed the Muslim publics in Ankara in April 2009, Cairo in
June 2009, and at the State Department in May 2010. During his June 2009 Cairo
speech, Obama promised a ‘new beginning’ for the US and the Muslim world,
‘one based on mutual interest and mutual respect, and one based upon the truth
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that America and Islam are not exclusive and need not be in competition’.15 The
fact that Obama failed to visit Israel until March 2013 and the president’s and a
number of key US officials’ public statements revealing some differences of
opinion between Israel and the US regarding the region’s problems raised Israeli
concerns.16
Meanwhile, the administration abandoned the US policy of enforcing
democracy by applying military force in favour of attempts to promote
democracy in the Middle East via soft power. Within this framework, a number
of liberal groups and individuals directly involved in the 2011 Arab uprisings
such as the April 6 Youth Movement in Egypt, the Bahrain Center for Human
Rights, and grass-roots activists like Entsar Qadhi (a youth leader in Yemen)
received training and financing from organizations like the International
Republican Institute, the National Democratic Institute, and Freedom House. The
Republican and Democratic institutes, which are loosely affiliated with the
Republican and Democratic parties, were created by the Congress and have been
financed through the National Endowment for Democracy, an organization
founded in 1983 to promote democracy in developing countries.17 Following the
‘Arab Spring’, a number of youth leaders from Egypt and Yemen, who played an
active role in the uprisings, acknowledged the help of American training sessions
to use social networking and mobile technologies with the goal of promoting
democracy in triggering the revolts.18 Furthermore, the London paper The
Telegraph published in January 2011 a secret document sent from the US
Embassy in Cairo to Washington disclosing the extent of US support for the anti-
Mubarak protesters prior to the Egyptian uprising.19
The reason for the US support for the liberal groups in the Arab world can be
found in an August 2010 memorandum titled, ‘Political Reform in the Middle
East and North Africa’, circulated by Obama to his top civilian and military
advisers. This stated that Washington’s regional and international credibility
would be undermined if it were seen or perceived to be backing repressive
regimes and ignoring the rights and aspirations of citizens.20 And when the Arab
uprisings started, the Obama administration, by being ‘on the right side of
history’,21 aimed at winning popular support among Arabs, who were expected to
be less anti-American in return for the US support for the uprisings.22 But
Islamists, who had been the best organized political group in the predominantly
Muslim Middle East, have successfully filled the vacuum left by the fall of semi-
secular authoritarian leaders.
It should be noted that the US, while supporting the uprisings in Tunisia,
Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and Syria, pursued a cautious stance towards the revolts in
the Gulf region, which might be dominated by Iran. For example, the US turned a
blind eye to the Shiite majority’s uprising against the Sunni minority regime in
Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia’s and the UAE’s sending troops (in March 2011) to
suppress the revolt there. Massive human rights abuses followed in Bahrain
thereafter, which the US ignored. The Obama administration preferred stability
over democracy in Bahrain, where the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet is based.23 The US
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pursued a similar policy toward Riyadh by ignoring the kingdom’s brutal
repression of the Shiite majority’s protests in the oil-rich eastern province.24
Indeed, in Obama’s May 2011 speech, which declared full US support for the
uprisings in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Syria, and even in Bahrain (though as lip
service), there was not a single line about Saudi Arabia.25
The Obama administration regarded the rising Sunni Islamist axis, mainly
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey, following the ‘Arab Spring’ as a force to
counterbalance Iran and its allies Syria and Hezbollah. In the meantime, the West
would continue to impose economic sanctions on Iran and maintain talks on its
nuclear programme. The US also expected that by transforming itself toward a
moderate line the MB would contribute to the region’s democratization process.
On the one hand, Israel has regarded the new US policy as naı¨ve and a sign of
weakness, which might hamper Israeli security. Hence, Israelis started to
question the long-term US commitment to Israel’s security.26 On the other hand,
the US thought that Israel needed to acknowledge the unavoidable regional
changes following the ‘Arab Spring’.27 Indeed, in the post-‘Arab Spring’ period,
Sunni Islamism represented mainly by the MB has become a popular movement
in the Arab world. Even in the most Westernized of all Arab countries, like
Tunisia and Morocco, Sunni Islamist political parties became the parties of
government by winning parliamentary elections. Among many unknowns, the
‘Arab Spring’ has one clear message for the Middle East: the era of semi-secular
states, which were remnants of Arab nationalism, has finally come to an end. And
Islamism is now the region’s new political reality. US Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton’s November 2011 speech at the National Democratic Institute marked the
shift in US foreign policy; she declared that the Obama administration would
work with ascendant Islamist parties of the Muslim world in the post-‘Arab
Spring’ era.28
Yet US strategy seems to be problematic for Israeli security interests for a
number of reasons. First, it was unclear whether the MB would be transformed
into a moderate force or was merely pursuing a short-term pragmatic policy for
accomplishing its long-term Islamist goals. In fact, the Egyptian experience
clearly showed that after winning the elections the MB, along with the radical
Salafists, tried to advance its undemocratic agenda. Second, it is unclear to what
extent the Sunni Islamist axis will be able to counterbalance Iran, particularly if
the latter achieves nuclear arms capability. Third, the question of al-Qaeda
affiliated groups and other radical Islamist forces, which have become active in
the region in the post-‘Arab Spring’ period, remains unresolved.
Thus, the Arab upheavals have created a more volatile and hostile strategic
environment for both the US and Israel. But unlike Washington, given its
geographic location and tiny size Israel’s immediate security is affected by all
regional changes. The country has been particularly concerned about the rise of
anti-Israeli and even anti-Semitic governments in the region following the ‘Arab
Spring’.29 Indeed, Jerusalem has already two Islamist regimes (Gaza and
Southern Lebanon) on its borders, and following the ‘Arab Spring’ Egypt, which
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signed the first peace treaty with Israel in 1979, joined the list. Even though the
military ousted President Mohammed Morsi from power in July 2013, the MB
declared its resistance, and Egypt’s political future remains unclear.30 In a post-
Assad Syria, it is highly likely that a Sunni Islamist regime will be formed – the
question is whether it will be ruled by the MB or al-Qaeda.
A number of pro-West Arab monarchies – that is, Jordan, Morocco, and
Saudi Arabia – were not largely affected by the ‘Arab Spring’ mainly thanks to
their religious credentials. Jordanian and Moroccan royal families benefited from
being descendants of the Prophet Mohammed, while the Saudi monarchy both
utilized its close ties to the Wahhabi religious establishment and its status as
custodian of the holy city of Mecca and like Qatar the kingdom used its oil
revenue to silence any emerging opposition to its rule.31 Israel has been
particularly concerned about the future of Jordan, which signed a peace treaty
with Israel in 1994, and the Palestinian Authority (PA), both of which face an
uncertain future.32
The Egyptian problem
It was the administration’s quick abandonment of President Mubarak that raised
Israel’s concerns during the uprisings. Prior to the ‘Arab Spring’ the Obama
administration, while rhetorically committed to the promotion of democracy in
the Middle East, maintained America’s longstanding policy of supporting pro-
Western and semi-secular autocracies like Egypt. For example, prior to his 2009
trip to Cairo, when he was asked whether he considered Mubarak an authoritarian
leader, Obama replied, ‘No, I tend not to use such labels for folks. . . . He has
been a stalwart ally in many respects, to the United States. He has sustained peace
with Israel, which is a very difficult thing to do in that region’.33 But shortly after
the uprisings he quickly abandoned Mubarak, one of the most loyal and valuable
US allies in the region.
The new US policy raised concerns not only in Israel but also among pro-US
Arab leaders who feared sharing Mubarak’s fate.34 During the Egyptian uprising,
which ended Mubarak’s 30-year rule in just 18 days, the US and Israel found
themselves on opposite sides. While Obama was calling on Mubarak to step
down immediately, Israeli President Shimon Peres expressed his support for the
beleaguered president. ‘We always have had and still have great respect for
President Mubarak’, he stated, and expressed his appreciation for the Egyptian
president upholding the peace treaty with Israel.35
Having seen the Obama administration’s quick abandonment of Mubarak,
both Israel and pro-West Arab leaders started to question the reliability of the US
as an ally.36 Indeed, when the ‘Arab Spring’ arrived in Libya in February 2011,
Washington also deserted Muammar Qaddafi, who had cooperated with the West
by abandoning his arsenal of weapons of mass destruction in 2003.37 Even though
the US had no vital interest in the removal of Qaddafi from power, it pushed its
NATO allies to conduct a military operation in Libya.38 The US response to the
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Arab uprisings weakened the country’s credibility in the region. Jordan’s King
Abdullah II, for example, when asked whether the region’s leaders could still
depend on the US following Mubarak’s fall, echoed Israel’s concerns by saying
that ‘I think everybody is wary of dealing with the West. . . . Looking at how
quickly people turned their backs on Mubarak, I would say that most people are
going to try and go their own way’.39
Following Mubarak’s fall, the MB’s Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) won the
parliamentary elections in January 2012, receiving 47.2% of the popular vote and
235 of 498 seats in the parliament. The radical Salafi Nur Party followed the FJP,
getting 24.3% of the votes and 121 seats in the parliament. The liberal NewWafd
Party and the secular Egyptian Bloc coalition received only 7.6% (38 seats) and
6.8% (34 seats), respectively. Thus, the first post-Mubarak parliamentary
elections in Egypt marked a victory for the Islamists.40
While the elections were being held, the Obama administration publicly
embraced the FJP. Then Chair of the Foreign Relations Committee Senator John
Kerry described the new US foreign policy toward Egypt by stating, ‘The United
States needs to deal with the new reality’.41 Given the MB’s assurances that its
politicians aimed at building a modern democracy that would respect individual
freedoms, free markets, and international commitments, including Egypt’s peace
treaty with Israel, the Obama administration hoped that the US–MB relationship
would set an example for other Islamist political parties which came to power in
the Middle East following the ‘Arab Spring’.42 Yet in post-Mubarak Egypt
Islamist attacks against the country’s Coptic Christian community, which
represents around 10% of the country’s 85 million population, have increased.43
In the meantime, the MB further increased its political power in June 2012,
when the FJP leader Mohamed Morsi was elected as president, winning 51.7% of
the votes. Egypt’s secular politicians accused the MB of ‘hijacking’ the
revolution, and criticized the US for swaying the presidential race in Morsi’s
favour.44 The Obama administration based its policy on the MB’s pragmatism,
which needed to maintain a working relationship with the US in order to assure
around $1.3 billion annual American financial assistance and US backing for
receiving debt deals from the IMF. Yet the US policy was questionable in the
long term given the fact that the MB’s worldview, which rejects equal status for
women and Copts, is inconsistent with America’s values.45 Indeed, the MB,
along with the Salafists, started to suppress the liberal and secular segment of
Egyptian society, the Copts, and the press.46 In July 2012 a number of Coptic
Christian political figures expressed their discontent with the US support for the
MB by declining an invitation to meet with the US Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton.47 As a result of violent Islamist attacks, around 93,000 Copts migrated
from Egypt to the US and EU countries between March and September 2011.48
And the US State Department’s 2012 annual report on human rights noted that
under MB rule women and minorities have become the target of violent attacks.49
According to one estimate, no fewer than 100,000 Copts had left Egypt since the
MB came to power.50
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The US policy of controlling the MB’s actions through financial assistance
proved ineffective. Since the fall of the Mubarak regime there has been a drop in
tourism and foreign investment, and Egypt’s reserves of hard currency fell to
about $13 billion from $36 billion.51 Yet, despite Egypt’s economic turmoil and
political unrest, Morsi issued an edict in November 2012 exempting his decrees
from judicial review until the ratification of a new constitution.52 Tens of
thousands of liberal and secular Egyptians took the streets to protest against
Morsi, while Egypt’s Supreme Council of the Judiciary condemned the president
for ‘assaulting’ the judiciary’s independence.53 Yet the MB and the Salafis rushed
through an undemocratic and Islamist new constitution by holding a referendum
in December 2012. The new constitution, which Amnesty International criticized
for limiting fundamental freedoms and ignoring the rights of women,54 passed by
63.8% of the popular vote with a low electoral turnout of 32.9%.55 The US
Secretary of State John Kerry,56 while expressing concerns about the suppression
of Egypt’s opposition, continued to provide financial assistance to revive the
country’s economy.57 And in May 2013 Morsi further strengthened the MB’s
hold on power by forming a new cabinet.58
The MB, while increasing the Islamist movement’s power in Egypt, pursued a
pragmatic policy of maintaining the status quo with Israel, which included
maintaining the peace treaty with Israel and mediating a ceasefire between Israel
and Hamas in November 2012. Yet there was also a shift in Egypt’s foreign
policy contrary to Israel’s security interests. The MB formed close relations with
Hamas, the MB in Syria, and Iran. Furthermore, under MB rule, Islamist militants
have become active in the Sinai Peninsula. Indeed, Morsi halted the Egyptian
military’s planned November 2012 offensive against the jihadists, including
Gazan militants, in Sinai.59
A number of high-ranking MB officials’ anti-Israeli statements also revealed
their real intentions toward Israel. For example, Deputy Chief of the MB Rashad
Bayoumi argued in January 2012 that Egypt might choose to revise its peace
treaty with Israel by holding a referendum. Moreover, he also maintained that the
MB was not required to recognize Israel by calling it ‘an occupying entity’ and
declaring that ‘we will not allow any one of our members to meet with an
Israeli’.60 Following the MB’s strengthened political power in Egypt, some of its
high-ranking officials increased their anti-Israeli stance. Deputy Chair of the FJP
Essam Erian stated in January 2013 that Israel would cease to exist within a
decade.61 It should be noted that in 2010 Morsi, then a MB politician, made an
anti-Semitic remark, calling Israelis ‘the descendants of apes and pigs’.62
A 2011 Pew poll showed that an important segment of Egyptian society was
already receptive to the MB’s anti-Israeli rhetoric: 54% of the respondents stated
that they wanted the 1979 peace treaty with Israel abolished, while only 36%
wanted it to be maintained.63 And a March 2013 Pew poll showed that under MB
rule support among the Egyptian society to annul the treaty with Israel increased
to 63%, while only 32% of the respondents wanted it to be maintained. The poll
also revealed that an overwhelming majority of Egyptians (92%) expressed a
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negative view of Israel, while only 7% of the respondents expressed a positive
opinion. According to the poll, only 3% of Egyptians claimed that it was
important to prioritize having a good relationship with Israel, while 88%
disagreed.64
However, despite the MB’s anti-Israeli rhetoric and its authoritarian policies
in Egypt, the Obama administration continued to view the MB as a valuable
partner in the region.65 This was even so when the US embassies in Egypt, Libya,
Yemen, and Tunisia were targeted by Islamists in September 2012.66 During the
September 2012 Cairo attack, Egyptian security forces were reluctant to restrain
the violent protesters who invaded the embassy, tore down the American flag, and
replaced it with a flag that resembled al-Qaeda’s black banner. President Morsi
did not immediately denounce the attack.67 In the aftermath of the incident
Obama stated that he would no longer call Egypt an ‘ally’, nor would he refer to
the country as an enemy.68 The series of Islamist attacks on the US embassies
revealed not only the weakened position of the US in the Middle East in the post-
‘Arab Spring’ era, but also showed the failure of the Obama administration’s
policy of winning the hearts and minds of the Arab publics in return for US
support for the uprisings.69
Contrary to US expectations, since the ‘Arab Spring’ anti-American violence
in the Middle East has been on the rise. Authoritarian regimes like Egypt, Libya,
Tunisia, and Yemen, which restrained violent Islamist anti-American groups,
were overthrown.70 The September 2012 anti-American attacks in the Middle
East revealed not only the persistence of anti-American and anti-Western
sentiments in that region,71 but also Washington’s weakened position despite its
support for some of the region’s popular uprisings as the country has become a
vulnerable target since the ‘Arab Spring’.72
Polls show the persistence and rise of anti-Americanism in the Middle East.
For example, a 2013 Pew poll showed that 81% of Egyptians expressed an
unfavourable opinion of the US, compared to 79% in 2011 and 70% in 2009.
Moreover, in 2013 only 16% of Egyptians expressed a positive opinion of the US,
lower than the 27% registered in 2009 after President Obama took office, and
lower than the 22%who expressed a favourable view of the US in 2008, President
Bush’s final year in office.73 A 2012 Pew poll revealed similar trends in Jordan
and Lebanon. In 2012, the number of Jordanians expressing a favourable opinion
of the US dropped to 12% from 19% in 2008, while the number of Lebanese
expressing a favourable opinion of the US dropped to 48% in 2012 from 51% in
2008. It is interesting to note that between 2008 and 2012 there was only a 3%
increase in Turkey (from 12% to 15%) among those who expressed a favourable
opinion of the US74
In June 2013, the liberal and secular segment of the Egyptian society started
to protest against Morsi’s authoritarian policies favouring the Islamist movement.
Yet the Obama administration continued to support the MB government. US
Ambassador to Cairo Anne Patterson, for example, expressed the US opposition
to the anti-Morsi protests in her public speech. ‘Some say that street action will
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produce better results than elections’, she argued. ‘To be honest, my government
and I are deeply sceptical’.75 By pursuing a pro-MB policy the Obama
administration alienated the liberal and secular segment of Egyptian society,76
which further weakened the US standing in Egypt. The demonstrators held up
posters of Ambassador Patterson,77 demanding that she leave Egypt, and banners
stating for example: ‘Obama and Patterson support terrorism’ and ‘Wake up
America, Obama Backs Up a Fascist Regime in Egypt’.78 When it was clear that
the military would oust the MB government, then the Obama administration
refrained from condemning the military intervention and did not call it a ‘coup’.79
This time, Islamists took to the streets accusing the Armed Forces Commander
Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, who led the ouster, of being ‘America’s agent’. Thus, the
administration simultaneously alienated all sides from the US and anti-
Americanism has been on the rise in Egypt.80 The weakened US position in the
region negatively affects Israeli security.
The question of Iran
How to contain Iran’s nuclear programme has formed another bone of contention
between Washington and Jerusalem. For the US, a nuclear Iran will damage
American credibility and interests in the Middle East. Iran is located alongside
the Caspian Basin and Persian Gulf – both regions comprise nearly 70% of the
world’s oil and 40% of natural gas reserves, which are vital to US interests. The
West fears that Iran’s hegemonic aspirations in the region, particularly in the
Gulf, Iraq, and the Levant, will be emboldened and the country will increase its
support for Islamist terrorism if it were to achieve nuclear arms capability.
A nuclear-armed Iran may also trigger an arms race in the Middle East as it is
highly likely that other regional powers such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey
would seek to develop their own nuclear weapons. Furthermore, there would also
be the danger of a nuclear weapon falling (or being passed) into the hands of
terrorist organizations.81 Yet the US can still live with a nuclear-armed Iran by
containing it as it did with the Soviet Union during the Cold War. But for Israel a
nuclear-armed Iran is an existential threat since Tehran denies Israel’s right to
exist and calls for its destruction.82
Given the deep economic crisis, which resulted in significant cuts even in the
Pentagon’s budget,83 it is highly unlikely to see a US military attack against
Iran’s nuclear facilities. The costly US experience in Iraq and Afghanistan also
made Americans weary of war. For example, a March 2013 Washington Post-
ABC News poll suggested that 58% of Americans said Iraq was not worth the
fight, while 56% stated the same about Afghanistan.84 Yet a March 2013 Pew poll
also suggested that 64% of Americans and 68% of Israelis favoured military
action to prevent Iran developing a nuclear weapon.85
The Obama administration expressed opposition to a possible Israeli
unilateral military strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities on the grounds that such
an attack would draw the US into another military conflict since Tehran would
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retaliate by attacking Israel and US forces in Afghanistan.86 For example, the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, stated in August
2012 that an Israeli attack on Iran would not stop its nuclear programme and
argued that he did not want US forces to be complicit in any Israeli strike on
Iran.87
By imposing economic sanctions on Iran the Obama administration hopes to
dissuade it from its nuclear programme. Israel, which believes that Iran has been
utilizing the negotiations to gain time for developing its nuclear weapons, has
been sceptical about the success of the US sanctions policy.88 Indeed in February
2013, Iran, ahead of the new US sanctions, announced that it would speed up the
pace of its uranium enrichment.89 Furthermore, a February 2013 Gallup poll also
revealed that the sanctions do not seem to be successful at turning Iranian public
opinion against the nuclear programme and against national leaders for behaving
in a way that has invited sanctions. A significant segment of Iranians (63%)
argued that Iran should continue its nuclear programme, even if it leads to the
imposition of economic sanctions. Only 17% stated the opposite, while 19%
claimed that they did not know or refused to answer. The poll also showed that
Iranians were almost five times as likely to blame the US for sanctions (47%) as
they were to blame their own government (10%). The poll indicated that, contrary
to US expectations, the sanctions, even though they are harming Iran’s economy,
did not seem to weaken the Iranian public’s support for the nuclear programme,
but rather reinforced popular antagonism toward the US. Thus, Iranian leaders
did not need to worry about possible public discontent regarding the country’s
nuclear programme.90
The impact of the Arab upheavals on Iran’s regional power remains to be
seen. Iran regarded the uprisings as an ‘Islamist awakening’ against Western-
backed autocrats similar to its 1979 Islamic revolution.91 Yet the resurgence of
the region’s Sunni–Shiite divide mainly as a result of the Syrian civil war, in
which Iran and its proxy Hezbollah support the Bashar Assad regime, while the
Sunni axis – mainly Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey, and Jordan – support
the anti-Assad forces, limited Iran’s appeal to the Arab world. Furthermore,
Hamas, another proxy of Iran, fled from Damascus and moved toward the Sunni
Islamist axis of Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey. Yet, with the fall of MB rule in Egypt,
Hamas might seek to form an alignment with Iran again.
In the post-‘Arab Spring’ period the US has regarded the formation of
alliances based on the region’s Sunni–Shiite rivalry as an opportunity to
counterbalance Iran. Yet both post-Mubarak Egypt and Iran, for all their sectarian
differences in general, and their opposing positions on the Syrian civil war in
particular, moved to improve their bilateral relations. For example, in February
2011 Egypt allowed the passage of Iranian warships through the Suez Canal.92
The bilateral relations deepened under MB rule. Unlike Mubarak, who perceived
Iran as Egypt’s foremost security threat, Morsi sought to form close relations with
the Islamic republic. Egypt under the MB government also started to abandon its
traditional foreign policy of maintaining close relations with the US and Israel
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and instead aimed at pursuing a more independent stance guided by Islamism.93
In line with this policy, Cairo welcomed thawing relations with Tehran, with
Morsi visiting Iran in August 2012 for a meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement
and Ahmadinejad reciprocating by visiting Cairo in February 2013 for the
summit of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation.94 In March 2013 Egypt
agreed to allow $5 billion worth of Iranian investments.95 The rapprochement
between Egypt and Iran referred to the weakening of the US-led alliance of
Egypt, Jordan, the Persian Gulf monarchies, Turkey, and Israel to counterbalance
Iran.96 With respect to Hamas, the MB government opened the Rafah crossing to
Gaza in May 2011.97
It should be noted that a significant segment of Egyptians supported their
country’s policy towards Iran. A September 2012 poll conducted by the
Washington-based research firm Greenberg-Quinian-Rosner showed that 65% of
Egyptian respondents expressed their support for the decision to renew the
Egyptian–Iranian relations and 61% expressed support for the Iranian nuclear
project versus 41% in August 2009. Sixty-two per cent of Egyptians argued that
they regarded Iran and President Ahmadinejad as friends of Egypt, though 68%
of the respondents held unfavourable views of Shiite Muslims. Likewise, 74% of
Egyptians expressed their disapproval of Egypt having diplomatic relations with
Israel, while 77% of the respondents argued that the peace treaty with Israel
should be dissolved.98
Thus, the Egyptian–Iranian cooperation proved that Obama’s policy of
exploiting the region’s sectarian conflict to counterbalance Iran failed to bring the
expected result. Under MB rule it was mainly the Salafis who vehemently
opposed Egypt forming close relations with Iran given their fear of Shiite
proselytizing.99 For decades the MB harshly criticized Egypt’s secular leaders for
serving US and Israeli interests by shunning Iran, with MB relations with Iran’s
religious establishment dating way before the 1979 Islamic revolution. In fact,
Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamanei himself translated theMB’s main
ideologue Sayyid Qutb’s works into Persian.100 Small wonder that Iran, along
with Turkey and Qatar, harshly criticized the Egyptian military for ousting Morsi
from power in July 2013 – paradoxically, along the Obama administration.101
Another example of showing the limits of sectarian conflict in the region was the
MB’s staging an anti-Israel rally in Cairo in May 2013 to protest at Israeli
airstrikes on Syria. The protesters chanted the slogans of ‘the people want the
destruction of Israel’ and ‘Israel is our enemy’. This incident clearly showed that
enmity to Israel trumps the sectarian divide among the Islamists.102
Iran’s new president Hassan Rouhani, who won the June 2013 elections,
portrays himself as a moderate, and is looked upon by the Obama administration
as a true partner for resolving Iran’s nuclear programme by diplomatic means.
But Israel argues that the country’s foreign policy, controlled by Supreme Leader
Khamenei, is not likely to change. Indeed, in the August 2013 al-Quds Day
celebration Rouhani called Israel ‘a sore has been sitting on the body of the
Islamic world for many years’.103 Shortly before his visit to Israel in March 2013
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Obama defined Iranian nuclear weapons as a ‘red line’ that threatened Israel and
the US, while stressing the ‘unbreakable’ US commitment to Israel’s security.104
Yet Israel, given its doubts regarding the US military commitment to prevent Iran
from acquiring nuclear weapons, declared in August 2013 that it is capable of
carrying out a unilateral military strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities without
American operational support.105 But a February 2012 poll conducted by Shibley
Telhami, a professor of political science at Maryland University, suggested that
81% of Israelis opposed a unilateral strike on Iran without the US support.106
While it remains to be seen how the Iranian nuclear issue will be resolved, the US
policy of conducting negotiations while imposing economic sanctions and
utilizing the Sunni Islamist axis to weaken Iran has not slowed down the
country’s nuclear programme. In fact, Iran’s new Foreign Minister Mohammad
Javad Zarif stated in August 2013 that Western sanctions could not force Iran to
change its policy on its nuclear programme.107 And the Sunni Islamist axis will
not be able to counterbalance a nuclear-armed Iran.
Al-Qaeda in the Middle East
In the post-‘Arab Spring’ period, al-Qaeda affiliates have become active in the
Middle East and North Africa. The assassination of Osama Bin Laden as well as
other al-Qaeda leaders and operatives by US Special Forces weakened the
organization in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Somalia, and Yemen. But al-Qaeda
quickly seized the ‘Arab Spring’ as an opportunity to increase its activities in the
Middle East and North Africa. Autocratic governments, which were keeping
Islamist extremist groups in check, were ousted by the uprisings.108 During his
September 2011 speech al-Qaeda’s new leader Ayman Zawahiri asserted that the
US was weakened following the Arab uprisings, and praised the revolts that
toppled leaders in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya, while urging other Muslims to
overthrow their rulers as well.109
In North Africa, al-Qaeda of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has benefited from
fragmented politics and security vacuums created by the ‘Arab Spring’. For
example, Tunisia, which tried to reform its dysfunctional security services to
counter the radical Islamist threat, has become a smuggling corridor for arm
dealers between Libya and Mali. Furthermore, following the French intervention
in Mali, several Moroccans have joined radical Islamist groups there.110 The
Salafist-jihadist organization Ansar al-Sharia Tunisia, whose members were
involved in the September 2012 attack on the US Embassy in Tunis, has been
active since March 2011 in undertaking the da’wa (propagation of the faith)
through a variety of social services.111
Al-Qaeda has become an active force in Libya since the uprising began
against Qaddafi’s rule. And particularly since the fall of Qaddafi in October 2011,
there has been the problem of an unchecked flood of weapons out of Libya,
including thousands of shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles known as Manpads
(man-portable air defence systems) to al-Qaeda affiliated jihadist groups across
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North Africa such as Mali, Niger, and northern Nigeria.112 Following the fall of
Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh in February 2012 the al-Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) seized control of almost half of the country before
being driven back by an offensive by the new Yemeni government and US drone
strikes.113 It is important to note that several Yemenis belonging to the AQAP
took part in the September 2012 terrorist attack on the US embassy in Benghazi,
which left four American citizens dead including the ambassador to Libya.114
Al-Qaeda has also become active in Gaza. The Mujahideen Shura Council in the
Environs of Jerusalem, an al-Qaeda affiliate group based in Gaza, fired missiles
from Sinai and Gaza to Israel in March and April 2013.115
About a year after the Syrian uprising started against Assad’s rule, Jabhat al-
Nusra, which is backed by al-Qaeda’s branch in Iraq, became increasingly active
among the anti-Assad forces in Syria.116 Former US Secretary of State Clinton
noted in February 2013 that rebels in Syria had been receiving messages from
al-Qaeda’s core leaders in Pakistan – a development that she called ‘deeply
distressing’.117 It is estimated that al-Nusra, which pledged allegiance to al-
Qaeda’s leader Zawahiri in April 2013,118 has about 10,000 fighters in Syria.119
The group has been receiving weapons and financial assistance from Qatar, Saudi
Arabia, Turkey, and Northern Iraq.120 And al-Nusra, which imposes a very strict
form of the Sharia rule connected to al-Qaeda,121 has become the best-equipped
rebel element in Syria.122 Furthermore, scenes of a radical Islamist Syrian rebel
eating a Syrian soldier’s heart in May 2013 shocked the world.123 Despite all
these facts, however, in May 2013 the US Senate voted overwhelmingly to arm
and train elements of the Syrian rebels. Senator Rand Paul (R-KY) harshly
criticized members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee by stating, ‘This
is an important moment. You will be funding, today, the allies of al-Qaeda. It’s an
irony you cannot overcome’.124 Just a few days later, Obama announced that ‘the
al Qaeda threat is decimated and the scale of this threat closely resembled the
types of attacks the US faced before 9/11’.125 He also reiterated that the war in
Afghanistan would come to an end by 2014,126 and in order to make official the
US non-war stance Obama needed to end the Authorization for the Use of
Military Force passed by Congress in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks.127 The al-
Qaeda affiliated groups’ increased activity in the Middle East and particularly in
Syria128 is a source of concern for Israel. However, some US officials argue that
Obama’s options are more constrained in the Middle East and North Africa,
where the US has fewer intelligence resources and has seen staunch counter-
terrorism allies, such as Egypt’s Mubarak, ousted from power.129
It seems that some Israeli officials share the US perception that the Assad
regime, given its alliance with Iran and Hezbollah, is a more dangerous threat
than al-Qaeda.130 And Israel has toned down its opposition to Western arming
of Syrian rebels given that the country has focused on weakening pro-Iran
forces in the Syrian civil war.131 But the Taliban’s Qatar branch, despite its
sectarian competition with Iran, sent a diplomatic delegation to Iran in June
2013 for what a Taliban spokesman called ‘a meeting of two governments’.132
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Moreover, shortly before the meeting Zawahiri, while urging rebel fighters to
unite to bring down the Assad regime in Syria and build an anti-Western state,
called a jihad against Israel.133 Al-Nusra’s short-term objective – Assad’s
ouster – put it in an uncomfortable alignment with the US and Israeli interests.
Yet the question of what to do with the jihadist presence in the post-Assad era
remains an important question particularly for Israel given that al-Nusra has
become a force beyond US control.134 Britain’s security and intelligence chiefs
argued in July 2013 that ‘al-Qaeda elements and individual jihadists in Syria
currently represent the most worrying emerging terrorist threat to the UK and
the west’.135
Conclusion
The ‘Arab Spring’ revealed increasingly divergent strategic interests between the
US and Israel manifested, first and foremost, by the administration’s (failed)
attempts to court the surging Islamist forces, from Egypt’s MB to the Syrian
rebels. Based on the expectation of the MB’s progressive moderation and Iran’s
weakening by the emergence of a Sunni Islamist axis, US strategy has been
problematic for Israeli security interests for the following reasons:
. As shown by the Egyptian case, the MB’s rise to power has hardly
mellowed their Islamist goals. And while pursuing a pragmatic policy of
maintaining the status quo with Israel, high-ranking MB officials did not
fail to reveal their anti-Israeli animus. Despite the Obama administration’s
support for the Arab upheavals, hoping to win Arab hearts and minds, anti-
Americanism has been on the rise throughout the post-‘Arab Spring’
Middle East. The weakened US regional position has negatively affected
Israeli security.
. Washington’s attempt to utilize the Sunni Islamist axis to counterbalance
Iran failed to bear the expected result. Contrary to the Obama
administration’s expectations, Cairo moved to improve its relations with
Tehran. A similar trend has been observed in the relations between Iran and
Taliban’s Qatar branch. Furthermore, the American sanctions policy, while
damaging Iran’s economy, failed to slow down its nuclear ambitions and
diminish Iranian public support for the nuclear programme.
. Al-Qaeda affiliated groups and other radical Islamist forces have
intensified their activities in the region. With the autocratic governments
that had kept the Islamist extremist groups in check ousted by the
uprisings, the surge of al-Qaeda affiliated groups in Syria, Gaza, and
Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula has been a great concern for Israel. And the
question of increased activity of al-Qaeda affiliated groups throughout the
Middle East remains unresolved.
All in all, the past three years have showed the abysmal failure of Washington’s
policy of using the Sunni Islamist axis to counterbalance Iran while hoping for
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the MB’s moderation as a means for the promotion of democracy in the Middle
East. For liberal democracy to flourish in the Middle East the US needs to pursue
a policy of supporting liberals, women, and non-Muslim minorities in the region
and formulate a clear policy to deal with the threat from Iran and radical Islamist
groups like al-Qaeda. The post-‘Arab Spring’ era has created a more volatile and
hostile strategic environment for both the US and Israel. And this makes Israel an
even more valuable ally for the US.
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